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ABSTRACT
How does violence become understood as terrorism? In this arti-
cle, we show how a narrative approach to the study of violent
events oﬀers a conceptually productive way to understand the
process of “seeing” an event as a terrorist act, one that explicitly
integrates the phenomenology of violence. While the collective
practice of deﬁning terrorism in academia and the policy arena has
struggled to produce a universal deﬁnition, we identify a set of
“common sense” characteristics. We argue that if the framing of
violent events prominently features these characteristics as discur-
sive anchors, this primes processes of sensemaking toward inter-
preting violence as terrorism. While terrorism markers are often
articulated as being pragmatic and apolitical indicators of terrorist
acts, we show that they are indeed at the core of political contests
over historical and physical facts about violent events. The narra-
tive approach we develop in this article underscores that intuitive
leanings toward interpreting violence as terrorism are a sign of
political agency precisely because they are produced through the




of the event; material-
discursive practices
Introduction
Terrorism has been the most prominent security issue since the start of the new
millennium.1 Since 2014, series of deadly attacks in France, Belgium, Germany, the
United States, and Great Britain have fueled new anxieties about terrorist incidents,
particularly in Western countries. That the terrorism label has remained ambiguous and
contentious, with hundreds of deﬁnitions on oﬀer in the ivory tower and the policy
arena, has not limited its potency to attract public attention and shape state policy (see
e.g. Barrinha 2011). While we can perhaps identify cases of unprincipled, illicit “bad”
rhetorical deployments (Finlay 2009, 751–3), there is no universally agreed upon apoli-
tical “right” usage of the terrorism label. Rather, there is an implicit belief that what
Supreme Court justice Potter Stewart heard in 1964 from his clerk about pornography
also holds for terrorism – “I know it when I see it” (US Supreme Court 1964, 197).
But what precisely enables us to see terrorism? The narrative approach we develop
here illustrates that interpretations of violence as terrorism, while linked to the phenom-
enology of the event, are the result of a process of meaning-making in which language
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plays a crucial role. Whether violence becomes widely understood as a terrorist attack
depends to a signiﬁcant degree on the rhetorical choices made by political agents. While
it is now well-established in the existing literature that the stories political agents craft to
represent what is happening in a given situation, and why, are politically consequential
(Barnett 1999, 8–9, 15; see also Kettel 2013; Homolar 2011; Nabers 2009; Ben-Porath
2007), we argue that concentrating on the side of the speaker does not provide
suﬃcient insight into how and why stories work. The article therefore moves beyond
works that fall within the broad remit of securitization theory that focus on the centrality
of speech acts in the construction of security threats by political leaders (Buzan, Wæver,
and De Wilde 1998; McDonald 2008; Hansen 2012), as well as research on the instru-
mentalisation and projection of strategic narratives, primarily concerned with how these
forge shared meanings among policymakers and world leaders (cf. Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2018, viii). While being in direct conversation with such scholar-
ship, in contrast to these existing works in the study of international politics we put our
emphasis on better understanding how narratives serve to structure information and
experiences as a core element of the cognitive processes of sensemaking (e.g. Bruner
1991; Weick 1995; Weick, Sutcliﬀe, and Obstfeld 1999; cf. Brown, Stacey, and
Nandhakumar 2008, 1037). As we explain further below, this approach to studying
violent events opens up a route to (re)politicizing what is often perceived as
a “common sense” understanding of terrorism.
The article proceeds as follows. The ﬁrst section introduces a narrative approach to
the study of violence, and demonstrates the importance of identifying and understand-
ing the discursive anchors in sensemaking processes that encourage us to cognitively
attach a terrorism-centric meaning to events. Section two maps the core markers of
terrorist attacks that are found across the study of terrorism despite the absence of
a universally agreed-upon deﬁnition. Because of their high degree of visibility and
repetition in everyday debates over terrorist violence, we conceptualize these markers
as discursive anchors that foster the normalization of an event as an act of terrorism and
the crowding out of alternative interpretations. The ﬁnal section critically examines three
sets of violent events that share common characteristics in terms of time, space,
perpetrators, and victims, and demonstrates that phenomenologically similar incidents
can be narrated very diﬀerently. We argue that it is only when terrorism markers are
explicitly acknowledged and employed in the rhetorical claims made by political agents
as part of a terrorism narrative that an event becomes broadly understood as an act of
terror. In short, the labeling of violence as terrorism is a political act.
A narrative approach to terrorism
In the study of international politics, an analytical focus on the intersection between
narratives and security dynamics is generally associated with discursive approaches which
emphasize the productive power of language. Over the past few years, such scholarship has
seen the onset of a “narrative turn”, a gradual shift away from a broad understanding of
discourse toward the stories that political agents tell to advance (or constrain) policy
agendas (see e.g. Galai 2017; Subotić 2016; Homolar and Scholz 2019). Recent work has
explored, for example, how “strategic narratives” provide a tool for political agents to shape
behavior in the international arena and the “discursive environment in which they operate”
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(Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 2, 2018; Krebs 2015; cf. Shepherd 2015). These
works share the assumption that narratives have a deeper function in society and politics
than simply being one of many communicative ways for “someone telling someone else
that something happened” (Herrnstein Smith 1981, 228).
The approach to the study of violent events that we introduce here speaks to such
scholarship. Yet, rather than investigating the motivations and goals of political agents
as producers of narrative meaning, the article zooms in on how, when, and why the
stories they tell about violent events can foster the interpretation of an incident as
a terrorist attack (or not). This focus falls within the broad remit of the critical branches
of terrorism scholarship that treat terrorist acts as a socially constructed phenomena in
which discursive conditions and processes play a key role and which therefore reject
approaching terrorism as both an extra-discursive, objective entity and a source of
insecurity with clearly identiﬁable causes and solutions (Hulsse and Spencer 2008, 575;
Jarvis 2009, 14, 18; Dixit and Stump 2011, 502, 509; Patrick 2014). While viewing
terrorism as a narrative phenomenon is not new (see for example, Cobb 2013;
Pemberton and Aarten 2018; Graef, Da Silva, and Lemay-Hebert 2018), to better under-
stand how rhetorical choices shape political behavior at the intersection between
society and the individual, as well as between agency and structure, we put an explicit
emphasis on cognitive processes of sensemaking.
Narratives are discursive systems of meaning-making that are linked to the material
world surrounding us. They are an omnipresent feature of social life, as Barthes (1975,
237) suggested more than four decades ago. People rely upon narratives to make
sense of the world, to reduce its complexity, and to comprehend new information.
Narratives render matters “real” and give meaning to what would otherwise be
incomprehensible (Selbin 2010; Mayer 2014, 66, 71). In short, they play a central role
in constructing and symbolizing experienced reality at the level of both sensegiving
and sensemaking.2 As vehicles for structuring information, they are a “mode of verbal
representation” (White 1987, 26). While they are susceptible to change through both
negotiation and retrospective recasting (Tilly 2002, 9), narratives enable us to both
capture the many complex relationships and events that are integral to our everyday
lives and to make sense of seemingly unconnected phenomena (Fludernik 2009, 1;
Miskimmon, O’Loughlin, and Roselle 2013, 5).
Applying the logic of narrative meaning-making to episodes of violence suggests that
without narratives, such events remain unintelligible. Whether and how speciﬁc inci-
dents are constructed as acts of terrorism depends on the meaning discursively assigned
to what is happening, to whom, and why, rather than being simply determined by the
raw material of the event. Terrorism, then, is not a quality that merely resides within
a violent event, and there is no metaphysical essence that makes its appearance in
a terrorist act. Rather, it is both an interpretation that we subjectively project onto
violent events through narratives and a process in which we mould our understanding
of the occurrence to ﬁt pre-existing discursive maps. Violent events acquire a terrorist
meaning through creating discursive links between what would otherwise remain iso-
lated and largely unintelligible episodes (Graef, Da Silva, and Lemay-Hebert 2018, 2).
But if there is nothing intrinsic about terrorism, what is it that enables us to “see”
events as terrorist acts? We argue that a signiﬁcant part of the answer is found in the
way in which narratives foster making sense of unfamiliar material and events by
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presenting what is novel within a familiar code (Spradley 1980, 100; Altman 2008, 18;
Scovel 1978, 129). Even if we do not accept any characterization of a terrorist act as
either universal or dictated by the nature of the event per se, we suggest that the many
debates within the academic and policy communities over what distinct features should
serve to objectively categorize events as terrorism and a unique type of political violence
(cf. Boyle 2012, 529) impact upon processes of narrative meaning-making because they
are integral to this code. In particular, the comparatively salient elements of conver-
gence within terrorism deﬁnitions discussed below function as discursive anchors that
transmit “conceptual residue” and link past experiences of violence with a new situation
(Weick 1995, 50; Fillmore 1982, 111; Gamson and Lasch 1983; Rein and Schön 1993, 151).
In contrast to existing research that underscores how terrorism deﬁnitions are subjective
and prone to selection bias (Horgan and Boyle 2008), we therefore suggest that they
deserve our attention not because they are right or wrong but because they provide the
discursive setting in which the interpretation of an event as terrorist act takes place and
biases our understanding of what happens, to whom, and why in the direction of salient
“terrorist” reference points that we have previously been exposed to. If employed in the
message text, they act as cognitive cues that prompt memories of terrorist violence,
fostering unreﬂective knowledge toward interpreting a violent event as an act of terrorism.
A narrative approach to understanding violent incidents thus serves to reveal that
people do not – and, indeed, cannot – make judgments about the nature of an event in
a discursive vacuum. Whether we are likely to “know terrorism when we see it” when we
encounter stories about violent incidents depends on whether the narrative interpreta-
tion of this event contains discursive anchors that act as implicit cognitive benchmarks.
Such discursive anchors prime us to routinely evaluate new information within familiar
frames and to link together contemporary violent events with earlier episodes, even if
this involves disregarding or downplaying the substantive diﬀerences between them.
In a narrative analysis of violence, therefore, the debates over how terrorism should
be deﬁned matter because they enduringly and regularly expose audiences to claims
about constitutive characteristics. That they have failed to produce a universally
accepted deﬁnition does not have to be resolved to understand their narrative grip
(cf. Stampnitzky 2017, 2013). Indeed, even if deﬁnitions remained marred by contrac-
tions such as suggesting “that states can or cannot commit terrorism, or that terrorism is
only, or not only, violence against civilians” (Stampnitzky 2017; original emphasis), they
nevertheless expose us to the very same discursive anchors. As Lakoﬀ (2004) points out,
even if a frame is negated, it is still activated; and it is also ampliﬁed through repetition
in deﬁnitional debates. The reiteration and routinization of the core elements contained
in the plethora of terrorism deﬁnitions – as well as the broader public resonance – serve
as cognitive devices to anchor a new instance of violence as an act of terrorism and
provide the symbolic connection to past terrorist attacks.
The anatomy of terrorism
Terrorism remains a fundamental taboo inworld politics that is placed outside the boundary
of legitimate political contestation and dissent (cf. Loadenthal 2013, 93). Indeed, there is
a broad international normative consensus that any “criminal acts intended or calculated to
provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for
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political purposes” are unjustiﬁable (United Nations 1994). Yet apart from a negative deﬁni-
tion of terrorism as violence that is not insurgency, guerrilla action, ethnic riots, or hate
crimes, and that non-state actors should be considered as the primary culprits (Laqueur
1986), its exact meaning remains a matter of dispute in the international community. While
Brannan, Esler, and Anders Strindberg (2001) pointedly observed a “perverse situation”
where a phenomenon – terrorism – is extensively studied although its essence has not
been pinned down, traditional terrorism scholarship adds some depth to this minimalist
deﬁnitional compromise, providing us with the narrative building blocks to give sense to
violent events as terrorist incidents.
In 1988, Schmid and Jongman undertook a prominent survey of key terrorism
scholars, which continues to serve as a guide to understanding what constitutes
a terrorist act. Uncovering 109 diﬀerent deﬁnitions of terrorism, they were also able to
identify a number of recurring elements. Speciﬁcally, Schmid and Jongman 1988, 5)
located references to violence and/or force in over eighty percent of all deﬁnitions, while
the idea that terrorism has a political motivation and is related to fear and terror came
in second and third places, respectively. More recently, Schmid (2011, 86–87) oﬀered an
update on the core elements of a terrorist act, which again emphasizes lethal and life-
threatening physical violence as a key component but also places emphasis on a general
lack of legal or moral restraints as important terrorism signpost. The political character of
terrorist acts, either through the motivation of the perpetrators or the social repercus-
sions of the event, features centrally – as does the element of intentionally creating fear
beyond the immediate victims. This updated “consensus” contained within the surplus
of deﬁnitions understands terrorist acts furthermore as “threat-based communication
processes” that target “civilians, non-combatants or other innocent and defenceless
persons”, often as part of a “campaign of violence” rather than as merely an isolated
incident, to achieve the desired political outcome (ibid.).
These broad scholarly parameters for classifying violence as terrorism are echoed in
the way data about violent incidents is collected. Despite some criticism (e.g. Pape
et al. 2014), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which provides information on
“terrorist” violence from 1970 onward and portrays itself as the “most comprehensive
unclassiﬁed database on terrorist events in the world” (GTD 2015), is a popular
resource for terrorism scholars, policymakers, and the media. Overlapping with core
criteria provided by the scholarly community, the GTD codebook deﬁnes a terrorist
attack broadly as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear,
coercion, or intimidation” (GTD 2014, 8). To be counted as a terrorist incident,
a violent act must also fulﬁll two out of three criteria that are related to the goal,
purpose, and legality of the violence employed: (1) the act “must be aimed at attaining
a political, economic, religious, or social goal”, with the economic aim being profound
or seeking to achieve systematic economic change; (2) an “intention to coerce, intimi-
date, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the
immediate victims” must be evident; and (3) the act of violence “must be outside the
context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters
permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against
deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants)” (ibid.).
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Critical terrorism scholars have long taken issue with such a limited focus on deﬁnitions
and criteria that are ignorant of global and local historical contexts (Marie 2007; Breen
Smyth et al. 2008; Gunning 2007), and they also point to the prevalence of a selection bias
with respect to the agents of political violence that discourages the study of state
terrorism (Horgan and Boyle 2008, 52–53; Jackson 2009; Jarvis 2009). Indeed, to under-
stand more holistically how terrorism emerges as a problem or threat in the political
arena, scholarship within this “critical turn” in the study of terrorism has been committed
to deconstructing mainstream understandings of terrorism and unveiling the signiﬁcance
of subjugated knowledge (Jarvis 2009; Jackson 2012). Yet while such works showcase
alternative ontological and epistemological commitments, they nevertheless frequently
engage in deﬁnitional games, including with their orthodox counterparts. Indeed,
although they oﬀer competing conceptions of what should be understood a terrorist
event, the discussion still integrates the very same key markers. Notably, Jackson’s (2011,
123; cf. Stump 2013) redeﬁnition features a target audience beyond direct victims and
political objective, whereas he critiques the inclusion of “civilian” and the “random”
markers as part of the forest of misconceptions in scholarly deﬁnitions (ibid, 119–21).
Finn and Momani’s (2017, 838–4) “minimal foundationalist” conceptualization of terrorism,
in turn, explicitly includes civilian victims as well as the “indiscriminate” and “random”
markers in their critical discussion. Other examples of such reiteration practices within the
critical branches of terrorism studies include Gunning’s (2007) “political use of terror”;
Burke’s (2008) normative preference for a deﬁnition of terrorism as “political violence
directed against civilians”; and Smyth’s (2007, 262) emphasis that a critical approach sees
“political terror [as] antithetical to human security and wellbeing”. Works associated with
the critical terrorism studies ﬁeld thus echo the key markers contained within their
orthodox counterpart’s deﬁnitions, even if it is in disagreement. From the perspective of
discursive anchoring, then, such critical scholarship contributes to – rather than untwines –
their cognitive association with the notion of terrorism.
The above discussion suggests that despite the ongoing deﬁnitional contests, existing
scholarship has produced a number of terrorism descriptors that appear, phenomenolo-
gically, as “common sense” characteristics. The essential “material” ingredient for labelling
an event as a terrorist act is physical violence described as arbitrary, indiscriminate, and
extraordinary – violence that is constructed as illegal and morally unjustiﬁable, and as
targeting civilians and non-combatants for a (under-deﬁned) political purpose. A terrorist
attack is also associated with a high degree of premeditation, in terms of planning and
coordination, and with the clandestine and serial character of violence that is aimed at
addressing a secondary audience rather than the primary victims.
Yet the “things” used to identify a terrorist event do not merely act as “empty
receptacles of discourses nor do they have ‘essential’ characteristics …but [rather]
emerge in relation with material-discursive practices” Aradau (2010). They are neither
immutable nor passive or ﬁxed (Barad 2007, 151). And while neither discursive practices
nor material phenomena should be understood as ontologically or epistemologically
prior (Barad 2003, 822), as Hardy and Thomas 2015, 686) point out, “material objects and
discourses are intertwined, with the former acquiring its identity through the discourses
in which it is situated”. In this intersubjective process of meaning-making, narratives
function as the key device to hold meaning and matter together. Although the phe-
nomenology of violence matters in identifying “senseless” violence as terrorism, its
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discursive construction thus plays the lead role in giving sense to it. In what follows, we
illustrate that the material basis of violence does not automatically serve to cognitively
anchor an event as a terrorist attack in processes of sensemaking – even if it signiﬁcantly
overlaps with the predominant terrorism markers contained within the surplus of
deﬁnitions. Physical properties alone do not make us “see” particular forms of violence
as terrorism. Rather, it is the invocation of a terrorism repertoire in stories about violent
events that subconsciously pushes us in this direction, and a focus on narratives opens
up a pathway to look beyond what “happens” toward the context of meaning-making
that establishes an act of violence as terrorism.
The politics of labelling violent events
Political agents inﬂuence how stories about violent events are told. This includes
whether terrorist markers are built in as discursive anchors to tilt the sensemaking
scale toward terrorism interpretations of violence. While rhetorical choices may not
necessarily be the result of deliberate planning or extensive strategic calculation, they
nonetheless signal political agency. As Heath-Kelly (2018) underscores, political dis-
course makes a threat object hyper-signiﬁcant while simultaneously remaining ambiva-
lent and replaceable. The narrative meaning assigned to violent events that share the
same physical properties that are commonly used to categorize violence as terrorism
can thus diﬀer substantially, inﬂuencing both the category and the intensity of the
state’s response.
Violence against civilians
Stories about terrorist events evoke images of massacre, chaos, destruction, agony,
disorder, and carnage. They are ﬁlled with moral evaluations that make reference to
the innocence of their victims and the evil, dark, barbaric, uncivilized behavior of the
perpetrators. Uniting two core discursive markers of a terrorist attack, such terrorism
narratives are usually spun around violence against civilians in which the latter are the
main target rather than merely collateral damage. Like other fundamental “taboos” in
world politics (Price 1995; Tannenwald 1999), the deliberate targeting of civilians is now
a violation of norms of civilized international society and lies at the core of the interna-
tional community’s critique of terrorist events. Yet whether victims of a violent event fall
into the category of civilians is not always clear-cut, and often becomes a matter of
interpretation. This ambiguity extends to the reach and scope of international agree-
ments that govern the use of force.
The international legal framework prohibiting violence against civilians has been
a cornerstone of the inter-state system for nearly seventy years. Article 3 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War (ICRC 1949,
169–170) notes that its provisions apply to armed conﬂicts only if they occur in the
territory of the contracting partners, even if they are not of an international character.
The Convention deﬁnes civilians as those persons who are “taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms” (ibid.).
Prohibited acts include violence to life and person, the taking of hostages, and violations
of personal dignity. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was
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adopted in 1998 and entered into force in 2002, reasserts that “intentionally directing
attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities” constitutes a war crime in international armed conﬂicts (United
Nations 1998, 5).
The distinction between civilians and combatants in the use of force is also an
integral element of jus in bello and one of the basic rules of customary international
humanitarian law. Yet there is no provision for the civilian category in intrastate conﬂicts
that are not broadly recognized as armed conﬂicts or civil wars. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2016, Rule 3, 5, and 6) underscores that customary
international human rights law is unclear on “whether members of armed opposition
groups are civilians” – and as such subject to the loss of protection from attack only in
cases of direct participation – or whether they are generally “liable to attack” even if they
do not partake in hostilities.
In cases of non-international conﬂict, then, who should be classiﬁed as civilian is not
as clear-cut as contemporary political discourse on terrorism suggests. If there is no
armed conﬂict, the combatant status vanishes – but so does the category of the civilian.
In “peacetime”, both the perpetrators and victims of the use of force can be construed as
civilians. The violence-against-civilians discursive marker of terrorism thus creates two
critical openings for narrative contestation over the meaning of an event: (1) how the
status of the victims is represented; and (2) how the context of violence is deﬁned.
The status of victims
Non-state perpetrators tend to depict their victims either as combatants or as members
of the military apparatus and government oﬃcials “who are part of the presumed
oppressive apparatus” and therefore constitute legitimate targets (Walzer 1977, 202).
Governments and political leaders, in turn, emphasize the civilian status of victims in the
same event to represent violence as outside the boundary of legitimate conduct.
Consider the case of British Army soldier Fusilier Lee Rigby, who was hit by a car and
then killed with knives and a meat cleaver by Michael Adebolajo and Michael
Adebowale in Southeast London on 22 May 2013. Political debate initially centered on
whether this violent incident constituted an act of terrorism. The primary opening for
narrative contestation rested on the victim’s status as a soldier of a state that was
engaged in the global “War on Terror”: was he therefore a “legitimate” target? One of
the killers, Adebolajo, stressed that the victim was a combatant of a country “chasing us”
and “killing us” (quoted in The Telegraph 2013). In the immediate aftermath of the
attack on Rigby, he justiﬁed his actions by stating: “This British soldier is an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a tooth” (ibid.). The most prevalent counter-narrative emphasized
instead that at the time of the assault on Rigby’s life, he had the status of a non-
combatant as he was neither in service nor wearing a uniform (see Greenwald 2013).
While the latter interpretation became dominant, the initial narrative contestation was
revived when the Guardian journalist Seumas Milne argued that because Rigby had
taken part in combat operations in Afghanistan, the attack on him “wasn’t terrorism in
the normal sense of an indiscriminate attack on civilians” (Milne 2013).
Whether political violence is labeled as terrorism or not can matter greatly for how
such episodes subsequently feature in policymaking processes, perceptions of risk, or
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as justiﬁcation for new state security initiatives. Following Rigby’s murder, the
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of the British Parliament published
a report on counter-terrorism shortfalls in November 2014 (ISC 2014). The ISC used
the incident as a cornerstone for arguing that existing UK counter-terrorism programs
were either “not working”, or, in case of the PREVENT initiative to counter Islamist
extremism, had not been given “suﬃcient priority” (ISC 2014, 2; on the UK’s PREVENT
strategy, see Heath-Kelly 2013). The British government declared Fusilier Rigby’s killing
“a sickening act of terrorism on our streets”, and responded by announcing eﬀorts to
have communication service providers report “imminent threats” to law enforcement
agencies, a more eﬃcient handling of “intrusive surveillance”, and the management of
“low level subjects of interest” (Cabinet Oﬃce 2015, 3). Narrating Rigby’s murder as an
act of terrorism came with a price tag of an “extra £130 million available to strengthen
our ability to combat terrorism” and found its way into the 2015 Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act (ibid.).
While Rigby’s murder was highly politicized with signiﬁcant policy reverberations,
an event in Wales that shared many of the violent features of the attack on the Fusilier
saw little narrative contestation. In June 2015, Zack Davies attacked Dr. Sarandev
Bhambra with a machete and a claw hammer and caused life-changing injuries.
Davis stated that the aim of assaulting Bhambra – whom Judge Rhys Rowlands
described as an “innocent man” – was to avenge the death of Lee Rigby, and that
he was inspired by both right-wing ideologies and the infamous Islamic State extre-
mist “Jihadi John” (Morris 2015). Although the victim had no connection to Rigby’s
murderers and was not a soldier but a dentist, the incident was not interpreted as an
act of terrorism, but instead classed by the police as “an attempted murder, racially
motivated” (Harley 2015) and did not receive any speciﬁc policy response from the UK
government. The victim’s community criticized the hesitance of the Police, Crown
Prosecution Service, Politicians, and the media to narrate his death within the terror-
ism framework, suggesting it had the characteristics of a terrorist attack, and demand-
ing the allocation of resources to protect the Sikh community (Asian Image 2015; Sikh
Channel 2015). The victim’s brother put particular emphasis on the opposing racial
disposition in the two related incidences; had it been reversed, he argued, the case
would have been interpreted as “an act of terror” (BBC 2015).
The context of violence
The second critical opening for narrative contests over the meaning of an event relating
to the violence-against-civilians marker is the context in which violence is understood to
occur. Of primary importance is whether an act of violence committed by a non-state
actor is considered to be part of a “proper” armed conﬂict. In cases of violence within
state boundaries, provisions of international law apply only to conﬂicts that take place
between governmental forces and non-governmental armed groups or between diﬀer-
ent armed groups that operate outside the state. Yet, the Additional Protocol II to the
Geneva Conventions from 8 June 1977 implies that, to be deﬁned as a “non-
international conﬂict” and thus to fall within the remits of international law, “dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups” involved must be “under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
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sustained and concerted military operations” (UN 1979, 661, emphasis added). The
Protocol asserts that its regulations do not apply to situations of “internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of
a similar nature, as not being armed conﬂicts” (ibid., emphasis added). The classiﬁcation
of intrastate violence as an armed conﬂict is thus dependent on the conditions of
protracted hostilities and that non-state armed groups must be organized.
International law, however, does not provide a precise “threshold at which violence
amounts to an armed conﬂict’ in the context of intrastate violence” (Sassoli 2006, 963).
This includes situations that at the international level are widely perceived as civil wars
where all warring parties ﬁght in uniform with light infantry-type weaponry and adopt
commando-style tactics. A current example of narrative contests over the classiﬁcation
of an intrastate conﬂict is the ongoing hostilities in Syria, for which president Bassar Al
Assad has systematically rejected the label of “civil war” between two domestic con-
tenders (Mroue 2012), and instead drawn a parallel to the terrorist attacks in Paris in
November 2015 that took place in the absence of intra-state conﬂict (Bacchi 2015).
What happens within state boundaries in “peacetime” largely remains outside the
scope of international legal frameworks, despite attempts to enshrine a responsibility
to protect and the principle of conditional sovereignty within international law. This is
partly owing to the tendency of states to want to limit the ability of the international
community to intrude in their domestic aﬀairs and avoid the international spotlight
from violent intrastate conﬂicts, because it could tie their hands (Scharf 2001). If the
situation in which an event takes place is interpreted predominantly as an armed
conﬂict, this poses a signiﬁcant challenge for political agents to frame a violent attack
as an act of terrorism. There is an incentive for governments to avoid representations
of violence as non-international armed conﬂicts, and instead to represent violent
incidents as sporadic and isolated.
In the contest to own the narrative, violent opposition groups tend to both advance
an interpretation of violence as part of wider struggle, and seek recognition as an army
or political organization engaged in non-international armed conﬂict to emphasize the
legitimacy, even legality, of their actions. “When you kill in war, it is an act that is
allowed”, noted Yigal Amir, who assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
(quoted in CNN 1995). Dissident groups often adopt names to suggest their status as
non-governmental forces engaged in “proper” armed conﬂict, ranging from the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
to the German Red Army Faction (RAF), a tendency which increased signiﬁcantly with
the increasing stigma attached to the terrorist label after the Second World War
(Rapoport 2004). Likewise, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) separatist group
carries out its attacks such as bombing shopping malls and politicians’ cars as “com-
mandos” and explicitly under the headline of “armed conﬂict” (Veres 2006).
Despite their eﬀorts to represent themselves as a legitimate warring party, intra-state
dissident groups are often labelled as terrorist organisations. In line with his conceptua-
lization of the Syrian war as a terrorism problem, President Assad has put in place both
a “Counterterrorism Law” and “Counterterrorism Court” to handle dissidence. This move
has invited widespread accusations of Assad using legal platforms against human rights
defenders and other peaceful activists in the name of counterterrorism (Al Arabiya 2012;
HRW 2013). Likewise, the inclusion of dissident groups such as the ETA, IRA, and FARC in
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the US list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations has signiﬁcant consequences for suspected
members, including restrictions on their ﬁnancial assets or isolating them internationally
(US Department of State 2017). This is in stark contrast to the recent peace eﬀorts
between the Colombian government and the FARC. The initial 2012 peace agreement
opened up a less confrontational route of engagement between the two parties by
explicitly refraining from employing terrorism terminology and instead prioritizing terms
such as “conﬂict”, “bilateral hostilities”, and “guerrilla organizations” (Gobierno de
Colombia 2012). In 2016, the Colombian government continued to describe the FARC as
a “guerrilla” and “armed movement” rather than labeling it a terrorist organization, and
encouraged the group to “do politics without weapons” (Gobierno de Colombia 2016).
Arbitrary violence
Delineating terrorism through the character of an act of violence is not limited to the
question of whether such violence claims innocent civilian lives. Analytically intertwined
with this is the degree of target selectivity and forewarning that is involved. The more
the use of force is narrated as arbitrary, random, and unexpected, the more it fosters the
post-hoc socio-political construction of a violent event as an act of terrorism. One of the
primary reasons for this is that striking targets in an indiscriminate fashion and without
warning lies outside the international normative framework for the use of force.
International law explicitly prohibits methods and means that are not – or cannot –
discriminate between military targets and either civilians or civilian objects, and this
holds for intrastate conﬂict (Crawford and Pert 2015, 198; United Nations 1998, 5).
The technology used to carry out violent attacks and the types of spaces targeted are
two core features to discursively establish whether the use of force is intentionally
indiscriminate, in particular in domestic contexts. In general, public venues like transport
hubs or food markets are associated with the presence of civilians. Spaces that are
presumed to shelter combatants or which, while being public, are occupied by soldiers
at the moment of the attack, do not as readily enable their representation as sharing
a comparable civilian character, thus making the construction of an episode of violence as
a terrorist attack less straightforward. Yet while some advanced technologies commonly
associated with acts of terrorism may appear more indiscriminate by design than others,
such as explosives and weapons of mass destruction, rudimentary devices can also be
used in an arbitrary fashion, as is the case in knife-wielding and vehicle-mediated attacks.
Nevertheless, the use of explosives in a metropolitan train station crowded with travelers
tends to be understood more readily as an indiscriminate act of terrorist violence, whereas
the use of boxing gloves to physically hurt passengers waiting on a remote railway
platform lends less discursive weight to the representation of violence as a terrorist plot.
These discursive markers have to be actively integrated into stories about the violent
event in order to help ﬁx its meaning as a terrorist attack. Take two incidents in China in
2013 as an example, neither of which was predominantly narrated as an act of terrorism
despite sharing many of the characteristics often harnessed to instigate a terrorism
narrative. In July 2013, the detonation of a homemade explosive device, without causing
fatalities, at Beijing airport by a man who protested his ill-treatment by the police was
not constructed as an act of terrorism by the Chinese government (Chen 2013; Zheng
and Baijie 2013). Neither did the incident lead to speciﬁc policy responses despite the
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fact that it triggered a “massive public discussion” about violence resulting from social
conﬂicts (Chang 2013). As in the case of the airport bombing, the oﬃcial Chinese story
did not designate as terrorism the explosion of nine bombs outside the headquarters of
the Communist Party of China in Taiyuan in the Shanxi province in November 2013,
which killed one person and left eight others injured. The perpetrator, an ex-convict and
local resident Feng Zhijun, had instigated the violence after his petitions failed to stop
a series of demolition orders for his home (Meng 2014). Again, rather than narrating the
incident as an act of terrorism, the Chinese authorities played down the Taiyuan attack
(Xinhua 2013). The muted government reactions to these “non-terrorism” violent inci-
dents are in stark contrast to the strong oﬃcial response to similar events in the Muslim
province of Xinjiang, where the Chinese state narrates violence as terrorism, almost
without exception (see PRC 2002).
With the technological and spatial characteristics of terrorism prone to conﬂicting
interpretations in the stories constructed about violent events, a third discursive marker
is often applied to underscore the arbitrary character of the violence: the element of
surprise. What singles out a violent event as an act of terrorism is the launching of
violence without confrontation or detection prior to the attack (Collins 2008, 400). Up to
the moment of the attack, the “terrorist” is unnoticed; how and why the violent event
takes place remains hidden until it erupts. The lack of anticipation is primarily owing to
the clandestine makeup and modus operandi of the perpetrators, who are presumed to
hold no territorial base, wear no uniform, and conceal their weapons, all of which lies
outside the boundaries of international law (Merari 1993).
The key here is the unexpected and random disruption of everyday life, which
challenges the international normative consensus on the use of force by violating
conditions of preemption and self-defense. As Sassoli (2006, 9) puts it, “it is diﬃcult to
conceive how an act could be labeled as terrorist if … the author identiﬁes himself as an
attacker while he is visible to the combatants he attacks during and prior to the
launching of the attack”. Ethnic riots or violent clashes between street protesters and
the authorities lend themselves less readily to being interpreted as terrorist incidents
because they are usually preceded by a confrontational situation that escalates (e.g.
Collins 2008). Within the context of such “highly patterned” events, violence is neither
random nor unpredictable and surprising (Horowitz 2001, 1). In contrast, a high degree
of surprise in discursive representations of a violent event, particularly in cases of
narrative contestation, tends to tilt the balance in favor of terrorism interpretations.
Political violence
The construction of episodes of indiscriminate, unexpected violence against civilians as
terrorist incidents usually depends on whether they are interpreted as inspired by an actively
political agenda or reduced to a personal matter. The “political” terrorism marker draws
attention to the agenda that underlies an act of violence in order to designate it as
a terrorist event. Yet it is diﬃcult to set boundaries between political motives and those
which are not (see e.g. Cassese 2006). As Wieviorka 2007, 96) suggests, “the political dimen-
sions of terrorism are permanently fuelled or invaded by other logics wheremeaning is lost or
overloaded by new elements”. The two deadliest shooting incidents in modern Californian
history are a case in point.
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On 18 July 1984, James Oliver Huberty committed a mass shooting in San Diego at
the San Ysidro branch of the McDonald’s fast food chain. This attack killed twenty-one
people and injured nineteen others before a SWAT team member fatally shot the
perpetrator. Justice Work described the incident, which took the victims completely by
surprise, as a “maniacal, mass murderous assault” and an “hour of terror” (Court of
Appeals of California 1987). The Justice pointed out that immediately after entering the
restaurant, Huberty “began indiscriminately slaughtering patrons and employees within
the glass-enclosed structure” (ibid.). While the precise motive for the attack remains
unclear, the perpetrator had long been disgruntled with what he saw as the deteriora-
tion of America because of the US government’s interference with business practices
and a “cabal of international bankers” (Brown 2012, 194). Despite explicitly referring to
characteristics such as terror, surprise, and arbitrariness as well as dissatisfaction with the
existing socio-political order in the US, the perpetrator was not portrayed as a terrorist.
Instead, the incident was predominantly narrated as a shooting rampage committed by
a “violence-prone loner” who had been dismissed from his job a week before the
shooting and who had problems with his wife (The Gazette 1984). Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, the San Ysidro shooting did not trigger any high-proﬁle political response. It did,
however, serve to rationalize the creation of a special unit in the San Diego police
department that is aimed at developing more eﬃcient weapons and tactics for the
police oﬃcers to face future shooting rampages (Kavanagh 2009). This is in stark
contrast to what happened two decades later.
California’s second-deadliest mass shooting took place at the Inland Regional Center in
San Bernadino on 2 December 2015 where the attackers killed fourteen people and
seriously injured twenty-two others in less than four minutes. The perpetrators were the
married couple Syed Rizwan Farook, an American-born US citizen, and Tashfeen Malik,
a Pakistani-born lawful permanent resident. Both were fatally shot by police during an
exchange of ﬁre several hours after the couple had ﬂed the scene in a rental car. A day
after the attack, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened a counter-terrorism investiga-
tion. While enquiries into their private communications revealed a “joint commitment to
jihad and to martyrdom”, the young couple did not have a history of promoting such
ideas on social media platforms – only posting a hastily composed pledge of allegiance to
the Islamic State shortly before they were killed (Serrano 2015). Despite the absence of
a public dedication to a radical Islamic philosophy, narratives quickly zoomed in on the
perpetrators’ inspiration by foreign terrorist organizations and self-radicalization.
In the following weeks, the readily available descriptors for the attack itself – civilian
victims, indiscriminate violence, and clandestine perpetrators, as well as elements of
surprise and premeditation – played little role in characterizing the violent incident.
Instead, the religion of the couple took center stage in ﬁxing the meaning of the event
as a terrorist attack. US President Barack Obama (2015) emphasized that the perpetrators
“had gone down the dark path of radicalization”. Although Farook, just like Huberty, had
a troubled childhood that included his parents’ divorce and potential workplace grie-
vances could not be ruled out, the dominant narrative centered on his potential past
plotting of violence (Finnegan 2016). Likewise, media reports focused on Malik’s reli-
gious devotion and orthodoxy rather than on either her experiences of social alienation
growing up in Saudi Arabia’s guest worker community or retaining her outsider status
later on in life as the “Saudi girl” (Bengali and Linthicum 2015).
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Similar to the San Ysidro incident, the San Bernardino attack was followed by debate
on the use of military equipment, particularly in those states where this had previously
been limited by the US government (Kates 2015). However, the explicit construction of
the San Bernardino shooting as an “act of terrorism” (Obama 2015) caused wider waves
in US security policy. First, it served to rationalize and legitimize the administration’s
ﬁght against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. For example, Obama rhetorically linked
the violent event in California to the military coalition ﬁghting IS, and promised further
airstrikes against Daesh as a response (Harris and Shear 2015). Four months after the
mass shooting, the Obama administration also approved an increase in the US Special
Operations forces in Syria, citing the unity in “the defense of our way of life” in reference
to the San Bernardino incident (Jaﬀe, Ryan, and DeYoung 2016). Second, the shooting
prompted a war of words among Republican candidates during the 2015–16 US pre-
sidential election campaign on how to regulate Muslim immigration in order to prevent
terrorist attacks (Oliphant and Whitesides 2015). Once in oﬃce, President Donald Trump,
signed an executive order that sought to ban refugees and citizens from seven Muslim-
majority countries from entry into the US. Although neither of the San Bernardino
perpetrators would have been aﬀected by the ban, Trump administration oﬃcials
explicitly used the event to justify the controversial order (Shear and Cooper 2017).
Finally, echoing security measures adopted in the UK in response to Rigby’s murder, the
San Bernardino violence triggered a debate in the US on the implications of encrypted
communication technology on counter-terrorism strategies (Nakashima 2015). For exam-
ple, in direct response to the incident, California Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein,
presented a bill requiring any company “engaged in providing an electronic commu-
nication service or a remote computing service to the public” to report any knowledge
of terrorist activities to authorities (Cockerham 2015).
This exploration into the politics of violent events highlights that the use of cognitive cues
that foster terrorist understandings of violent events is far from an objective, automatic, or
impartial process. Political agents may opt to integrate elements that are considered to be
symptomatic of terrorism to represent violent episodes as terrorist attacks – such as a wider
“campaign of violence” as well as a high degree of planning and organization. Yet, depend-
ing on speciﬁc settings and policy agendas, they may instead choose to fall back on the very
same elements to ﬁx the meaning of a violent event to the contrary. As our examples
showed, although the discursive construction of an event as a terrorist attack generally
becomes more challenging when the violence targets victims other than those readily
described as “civilians”, the story may very well zoom in on diﬀerent characteristics, such
as the ethnicity and religion of the individuals involved. Despite the high level of audience
recognition of the intentional targeting of civilians as a core marker of terrorist attacks,
a violent event still has to be narrated and interpreted in this sense to become widely
understood as an act of terrorism. Likewise, whether a violent act is interpreted as politically
motivated is highly ambiguous. Indeed, it appears that when the aim of a violent event is
perceived as external in terms of geography, identity or culture, then ideological and
religious agendas are more readily assumed to constitute a political aim. There is thus an
“othering” labeling bias in the narrative construction of political violence, in particular when
the event makes it possible to establish associations between Islam, violence, and terrorism.
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Conclusion
Processes of narration are necessarily selective; there is always more than one story to
tell. This implies that political agents may oﬀer competing interpretations of violence in
their attempts to “own” the narrative. Stories always stand in relation to other stories –
including their counter-narratives – with political agents’ struggling over having their
frame accepted (Boin, Hart, and McConnell 2009, 82; see also Holland 2009). Terrorism is
no exception, and in the “war of words” naming particular entities as terrorists has
political, economic and military implications (Turk 2004, 271–272).
But how do some acts of violence become widely understood as terrorist events,
while others do not? In this article, we have explored the narrative construction of
terrorist events and the role that discursive anchoring plays in this political process. We
argued that while the collective practice of deﬁning terrorism has done little to con-
ceptually pin down what terrorism is, the core characteristics the deﬁnitional exercise
has produced over time serve as discursive anchors that cognitively bias us toward
“seeing” an event as a terrorist act. When these markers are used so regularly to
designate a terrorist attack that they appear as intuitive, they form an integral part in
the social mechanism that primes processes of sensemaking in this direction. This
matters because they also implicitly set forth what type of violence is morally acceptable
and at what point the use of force enters the red zone of deplorable behavior, thereby
setting the boundaries of political possibility.
“Common sense” terrorism markers are at the core of language games about the
meaning of violent events precisely because they can be articulated as being pragmatic,
rational, and apolitical indicators. While the phenomenology of violence plays an important
role in terrorism stories, the meanings attached to events are subject to contestation and
political agents may oﬀer diﬀerent interpretations in their attempts to “own” the narrative.
The contest over historical and physical facts – the attempt by diﬀerent parties to establish
the “true” story that underlies and explains the event – reveals the importance of under-
standing terrorist events through a narrative analytical lens. As our analysis has shown,
what are often perceived as “intuitive” characteristics of a violent event do not inevitably
trigger an interpretation of violence as an act of terror – this depends instead on the types
of rhetorical claims made by political agents. How audiences comprehend violence, while
linked to the materiality of the event, depends on how it is framed and whether the
narrative contains discursive anchors that push our sense-making in this way.
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Sensemaking, in turn, is understood as the cognitive processes of attributing meaning to
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